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a b s t r a c t 
The complex multi-criteria optimisation problems arising in Kidney Exchange Programmes have received 
considerable attention both in practice and in the scientiﬁc literature. Whereas theoretical advancements 
are well reviewed and synthesised, this is not the case for practice. We present a synthesis of models and 
methods applied in present European Kidney Exchange Programmes, which is based on detailed descrip- 
tions we created for this purpose. Most descriptions address national programmes, yet we also present 
ﬁndings on emerging cross-national programmes. The synthesis provides a systematic and detailed de- 
scription of the models and methods the programmes use, revealing important commonalities as well as 
considerable variation among them. Rather than distilling a single best practice from these results, we 
ﬁnd that the variation in models and methods arises because of variation in country characteristics, poli- 
cies, and ethics. The synthesised state of the art may beneﬁt future national and cross-national initiatives 
and direct future theoretical contributions within and across the boundaries of the Operations Research 
discipline. 
© 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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t  policy, economics, computer science, mathematics, and in the
Operations Research literature. This scientiﬁc activity advanced as
existing KEPs developed and new KEPs emerged. It focused on the
complex and multi-faceted dilemmas which present themselves
when deciding which patients will receive a kidney - and may
improve their health and longevity - and which patients will not,
as yet. Should a ﬁrst aim be to help as many patients as possible?
Should longest waiting patients take preference? Or the sickest,
the youngest? These are just a few of the ethical questions that
KEPs raise and are being considered across scientiﬁc disciplines.
Moreover, these complex delicate questions arise in practice where
the answers provided have far reaching consequences. 
In view of the sensitivity of these questions and the impact of
the decisions for the individuals involved, operations researchers
and other scientists have treated the resulting allocation prob-
lems with the greatest care. This placed new demands on their
craftsmanship when developing models and solution methods. Of-
ten, such scientiﬁc advancement occurred in the relative safety
of purely advancing theory. Glorie, Haase-Kromwijk, van de Klun-
dert, Wagelmans, and Weimar (2014a) and Mak-Hau (2017) provide
overviews of such primarily theory oriented models and solution
methods. 
While the theoretical advances are thus well synthesised, this
is less true of the practical advances in modelling and solving
KEPs. Practical advances often differ from the theory development
as not all theoretical advances in modelling and solution methods
are suitable in practice. Conversely, practical models and meth-
ods have been inﬂuenced by medical and policy developments,
not all of which have reached the theoretical discourse. The
recently emerging cross-national KEPs and the policy dilemmas
they present illustrate such disconnects. Our research aim is to
extend the policy oriented overview of national and cross-national
European KEP practices by Biró et al. (2019) into the operations
research domain. To this purpose, we present a review and syn-
thesis of all models (including objectives and constraints) and
solution methods (including algorithmic techniques) actively prac-
ticed in European KEPs, as surveyed via a questionnaire that was
jointly developed for this purpose (original data are reported in
Andersson, Biró, & et al., 2019 ). 
For a number of reasons, European KEPs are of particular rel-
evance. Many European countries have advanced transplantation
programmes and have existing or newly developing KEPs. While
these KEPs follow common regulations (see European Committee
on Organ Transplantation (CD-P-TO) of the Council of Europe, 2018 )
each one is also clearly developed within a different national con-
text and with different norms and values. An overview of mod-
els and methods practiced in European KEPs therefore provides a
rich impression of related yet varied state of the art programmes.
Moreover, we describe and discuss the most recent advancements
in cross-national KEPs as they arise in Europe. The overview may
inform theoretical research, as well as practices in other countries,
European or not, who are developing (joint) programmes, models,
and methods. 
This research results from EU COST Action 15210, the Euro-
pean Network for Collaboration in Kidney Exchange Programmes
( COST, 2017; European Network for Collaboration in Kidney Eex-
change Programmes, 2017 ). 
2. Background 
2.1. Context and principles for KEPs 
The 2016 Global Burden of Disease Study identiﬁes chronic kid-
ney disease (CKD) as the 11th most common cause of death glob-
ally, accounting for almost 1.2 million deaths worldwide (2.17%)Please cite this article as: P. Biró, J. van de Klundert and D. Manlove 
Programmes, European Journal of Operational Research, https://doi.org/ Institute for Health Metrics & Evaluation, 2018 ). In Europe, Chronic
idney Disease accounts for 1.52% of all deaths. The number of
eaths resulting from CKD grows both in absolute and in relative
erms, and has almost doubled globally since 1990 ( Institute for
ealth Metrics & Evaluation, 2018 ). 
No cure exists at present for Chronic Kidney Disease. It may
rogress over several stages, the last one of which is called End
tage Renal Disease (ESRD). The most common treatment for ESRD
s dialysis, which is costly. Recent UK evidence estimates yearly
osts per patient at 15,0 0 0 to 35,0 0 0 GBP ( Baboolal et al., 2008 ). 
Compared to dialysis, the alternative of transplantation of-
ers longer life expectancy, better quality of life, and lower aver-
ge treatment costs ( Axelrod et al., 2018; Haller, Gutjahr, Kramar,
arnoncourt, & Oberbauer, 2011; Sánchez-Escuredo et al., 2015;
olfe, Roys, & Merion, 2010 ). Hence, transplantation is preferred
s a treatment across Europe. 
In Europe, transplantation treatments are often provided
hrough dedicated and well organised transplantation programmes.
nitially these programmes were set up to transplant kidneys from
eceased kidney donors (DKD). At present, most European coun-
ries operate nationally organised DKD programmes through which
he majority of transplants are conducted. There is a great varia-
ion in the volumes of DKD programmes across Europe, depending
n ethical and legal regulations, as well as on the operational ef-
ectiveness of the programmes and the healthcare systems in gen-
ral ( European Directorate for the Quality of Medicines, 2017 ). By
ay of illustration, the Spanish DKD programme has the highest
eceased donor kidney transplantation rate at 57.6 per million in
016. Germany, on the other hand, has a deceased donation rate
f 27.4 per million. From an operational perspective, variation is
ore limited, as many national programmes follow international
rotocols and standards, and collaborate across national borders
o improve effectiveness. The organisations Eurotransplant and
candiatransplant manage such international DKD programmes in
urope. 
In many European countries, the demand for kidney transplants
ncreasingly exceeds the supply of kidneys retrieved from deceased
onors. Hence, DKD programmes have waiting lists. Recently re-
orted waiting list lengths are for instance 2208 patients in Scan-
inavia (January 2018) and 5033 patients in the UK (March 2018).
oth of these numbers considerably exceed the yearly number of
ransplants performed in these countries, and the same applies
cross Europe and beyond ( European Directorate for the Quality
f Medicines, 2017 ). Patients on the waiting lists are typically on
ialysis, and it is not uncommon for patients to become too ill to
ransplant or to die while on the waiting list, as witnessed by the
eath rates presented above. 
In addition to deceased donation, kidneys can be donated by
iving donors, as the human body has two kidneys, while com-
only one suﬃces. Compared to DKD, living donor kidney dona-
ion (LKD) has better long-term patient and transplant outcomes
 Hart et al., 2017; MacNeill, Casula, Shaw, & Castledine, 2016; Wolfe
t al., 2010 ) (we refer to Reese, Boudville, & Garg, 2015 for a dis-
ussion of donor outcomes). This, in combination with the rel-
tively poor outcomes of dialysis and the shortage of deceased
onor organs, led to the establishment of LKD programmes in Eu-
ope, to complement existing DKD programmes. In 2017, the num-
er of transplants resulting from LKD as a percentage of the total
umber of transplant in Europe were for instance, 5 % in Germany,
0% in Spain, 26.4% in Scandinavia, 30% in the UK, and slightly over
0% in the Netherlands ( European Directorate for the Quality of
edicines, 2017 ). 
The default procedure to enable LKD is for a patient to ﬁnd a
iving person willing to donate a kidney, and receive a kidney from
his speciﬁed donor . In the remainder we will refer to such a pa-et al., Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange 
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 ient and donor as a pair and also refer to the patient as a recipient ,
r as the speciﬁed recipient of the donor. 
Even when a patient ﬁnds a speciﬁed donor, however, trans-
lantation of the kidney from this donor to the patient may be
nfeasible because the patient (recipient) and donor are not medi-
ally compatible (are incompatible ). Below we explain the forms and
eﬁnitions of compatibility, while noting already that these have
hanged over time. (The reader may further note that they also
pply in case of DKD.) Compatibility may take into account: 
• ABO-Compatibility refers to the blood types, A, B, AB, and O.
Type O donors can donate to all recipients. Type A donors
can donate to Type A and Type AB recipients. Type B donors
can donate to Type B and Type AB recipients. Type AB
donors can only donate to Type AB recipients. A donor and
recipient are said to be ABO-compatible if the blood type of
the donor and recipient are such that the donor can donate
to the recipient. 
• HLA-Match , which refers to the extent to which the Human
Leukocyte Antigens of the recipient and the donor are alike.
The more they are alike, the more compatible from a view-
point of HLA matching. When fully alike (e.g. for identical
twins) we speak of a perfect HLA match ( Fuller et al., 2004;
Terasaki, Cecka, Gjertson, & Takemoto, 1995 ). 
• HLA-Crossmatch refers to the test to decide whether a recip-
ient has antibodies to the HLA of the donor (in signiﬁcantly
high concentration). If this is indeed the case, one speaks of
a positive crossmatch which is seen as an indication that the
transplantation will not be successful. A positive crossmatch
is only possible when the HLA match is not perfect. (Below
we also elaborate on virtual cross matches.) 
Originally, recipients and donors were only considered compat-
ble when they were ABO-compatible, and there was a perfect HLA
atch (and hence the crossmatch is negative). The development
f immunosuppressant drugs made donation possible in case of
ess than perfect HLA-match. Recent advancements with so called
esensitisation also make ABO-incompatible and HLA-incompatible
ransplants possible ( Halloran, 2004 ). These dynamics have led to
he deﬁnition of half-compatibility ( Andersson & Kratz, 2016 ). A
ecipient-donor pair is said to be half-compatible when the cross-
atch is negative and transplantation between donor and recipi-
nt requires desensitisation to overcome ABO-incompatibility. Re-
ent meta analyses conclude that outcomes of state of the art de-
ensitisation treatment results are good but some are signiﬁcantly
orse than outcomes of ABO-compatible transplants ( De Weerd &
etjes, 2018; Scurt et al., 2019 ). 
Highly sensitised patients are less likely to ﬁnd compatible
onors due to the presence of high titres of HLA antibodies in
heir blood. Different KEPs use different parameters to characterise
high) sensitisation. Some KEPs give highly sensitised patients pri-
rity to improve their chances of receiving a transplant. 
Other factors that inﬂuence transplantation outcomes, in partic-
lar graft survival, relate to the quality of the kidney - which is for
nstance correlated with donor age - and the health of the recip-
ent - which in turn is correlated with recipient age and time on
ialysis. 
With these reﬂections on outcomes and deﬁnitions of compat-
bility at hand, we can now consider the purpose of KEPs. Origi-
ally, KEPs were initiated to provide recipients who do not match
ith their speciﬁed donor access to a compatible donor by ex-
hange of donors between recipients. In later years, the scope
f KEPs has been extended. Because of advances in immunosup-
ression and desensitisation, recipient-donor pairs that are (half-
compatible might still choose to participate to ﬁnd a more com-
atible donor. Furthermore, altruistic donors , i.e. donors without
n intended recipient, may volunteer to participate. Fourth, somePlease cite this article as: P. Biró, J. van de Klundert and D. Manlove 
Programmes, European Journal of Operational Research, https://doi.org/EPs integrate their LKD programme with the DKD programme,
.g. by starting chains with deceased donors. All of these exten-
ions are further covered below. 
.2. KEP design variations 
Below we synthesise the variations in the design of KEPs
s identiﬁed from the detailed data collected for the purpose
f our research by existing European KEPs ( Andersson et al.,
019 ). Detailed country level comparisons can be found in Table
 of Biró et al. (2019) and in Fig. 1 below. KEPs register a set
 = { p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n } of recipient-donor pairs p i = (r i , d i ) , i = 1 , . . . , n
here r i denotes the recipient and d i the donor of pair p i . 
• Exchange cycles: Initially KEPs sought to match recipient-
donor pairs together. More precisely, they sought to identify
two pairs p i = (r i , d i ) and p j = (r j , d j ) such that recipient r i 
is compatible with donor d j and - vice versa - recipient r j 
is compatible with donor d i . Such exchanges are called pair-
wise exchanges . The KEPs of some European countries, such
as France, are based on pairwise exchanges. Other countries
with larger programmes (UK, Spain, the Netherlands) also
prioritise pairwise exchanges (see below). 
Most of the European KEPs have advanced beyond pair-
wise exchanges, or are preparing to do so. As pairwise ex-
changes can be viewed as forming a cycle of length two, be-
tween pairs i and j , a natural extension is to cycles of length
three, also known as three-way exchanges . In a three-way
exchange, there are three pairs, p i = (r i , d i ) , p j = (r j , d j )
and p k = (r k , d k ) , and r i is matched with d j , r j with d k ,
and r k with d i . At present, the Spanish and the UK KEPs
only consider pairwise and three-way exchanges (for reasons
explained below). Four-way exchanges are allowed in the
Netherlands. Within Europe, longer exchanges are allowed in
several countries (such as Belgium and Portugal), yet so far
they have only been conducted in the Czech Republic. 
• Altruistic chains: Altruistic donation is allowed in some Euro-
pean countries. It is legally forbidden in France, Poland and
Portugal. Where allowed, it can take the form of donating to
a recipient in the DKD programme (by default in Belgium,
but occasionally also in other countries). the Netherlands,
Spain, and the UK explicitly incorporated altruistic donation
in their KEPs. An altruistic donor then donates to a (ﬁrst)
patient, whose speciﬁed donor can then donate to a (sec-
ond) patient and so on, with the last kidney donated to the
waiting list. Thus, altruistic donors may initiate an exchange
involving multiple pairs, which form a chain . As was the case
for cycles, KEPs may impose limits on the maximum num-
ber of pairs involved in chains. Such limitations vary across
European KEPs, roughly following the limitations on cycle
length described above. 
Alternatively, donation by the last donor may be postponed
to continue the chain at a later moment. The last donor
is then called bridge donor . Bridge donors can make chains
longer or even never ending . European KEPs have no explicit
arrangements yet for never ending chains. 
• Timing of match runs: A match run is the process of con-
structing cycles and chains among donors and recipients
participating in a KEP. Many European KEPs organise their
match runs periodically. Poland organises a match run every
month; the Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK have match
runs every three months; whilst Spain has match runs every
four months. Spain also organises match runs whenever a
new altruistic donor arrives. Other countries also choose to
organise their match runs on occasion, rather than followinget al., Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange 
10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.006 
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Fig. 1. Objectives and constraints in European KEPs. Numbers reﬂect hierarchy level, w denotes the criterion is weighed against other criteria at the lowest level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 periodic patterns. For instance, in Belgium the match runs
are organised when requested by a transplant centre. 
• Relationships with DKD: As it avoids health risks for donors,
deceased donation is often considered the default treatment.
Patients registered in a KEP therefore may also register for
the DKD waiting list. 
Some countries allow and utilise interaction with the DKD
programme in the form of deceased chains, when one recip-
ient in the KEP receives a kidney from a deceased donor and
then his/her donor starts a chain (as in the case of an altru-
istic chain) with the last donor donating to a recipient in the
DKD programme. Three such chains were started in Italy in
the summer of 2018. The most common modality for inter-
action with the DKD programme is through altruistic chains,
as described above. 
• Inclusion of compatible pairs: Some European KEPs explic-
itly restrict registration to incompatible pairs, e.g., Belgium,
France and Portugal. Other countries allow or even encour-
age compatible pairs to participate, to improve outcomes
for themselves and/or for other recipients. KEPs that enable
such participation often provide additional arrangements to
ensure that corresponding patients are matched to a donorPlease cite this article as: P. Biró, J. van de Klundert and D. Manlove 
Programmes, European Journal of Operational Research, https://doi.org/who is at least as good (to be deﬁned below) as their speci-
ﬁed donor. The KEPs of the Czech Republic, Scandinavia and
Spain have explicit arrangements for this purpose. Notice
that these KEPs may end up simply matching such recipi-
ents to their speciﬁed donors. 
• Desensitisation as an alternative of KEP: For ABO-incompatible
pairs transplantation from the speciﬁed donor to his/her
recipient is possible with desensitisation. Hence, these
pairs do not need to register in a KEP and be transplanted
through an exchange. The recommended pathway for such
pairs differs across Europe depending on healthcare sys-
tems, traditions and also the size and effectiveness of their
KEPs. If the default treatment is desensitisation and, as a
consequence, the KEP pool is small, then this gives another
reason for the patients not to register in the KEP due to
the relatively limited chance of ﬁnding exchange partners.
This is the case in France and Italy, for example. In the
countries with the longest standing KEPs (the Netherlands,
UK, and Spain) the policy is to prefer exchange over de-
sensitisation. As a result, these countries have larger pools
which increases match probabilities and reduces waiting
times for patients ( Biró et al., 2019 ). In these programmes,et al., Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange 
10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.006 
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a  the ABO-incompatible pairs which are not matched within a
reasonable period of time (e.g. two match runs) are advised
to consider desensitisation. 
• Allowing ABOi transplants in exchanges: When a recipient
is not even half-compatible with the speciﬁed donor, KEPs
may consider matching with half-compatible donors through
donor exchange. The Czech, Scandinavian, Spanish, and UK
KEPs presently facilitate such matches. 
• Multiple donors registering for one recipient: This is allowed in
most KEPs but not yet in Belgium, France and Netherlands. It
likely increases the chances of the recipient to be matched.
When the recipient is matched, only one of the correspond-
ing speciﬁed donors donates to another recipient. 
.3. Logistics and organisation 
Most KEPs require transplantations for all donors and pairs
n a same cycle to occur simultaneously to avoid withdrawal of
onors after their speciﬁed recipients have received kidneys but
efore donating themselves (see e.g. Cowan, Gritsch, Nassiri, Sina-
ore, & Veale, 2019 ). The Czech Republic and Poland do not en-
orce simultaneity in cycles and have successfully conducted non-
imultaneous exchanges (such as a 7-way exchange conducted in
he Czech Republic). As parallel transplantation may bring capacity
nd logistics challenges, a simultaneity requirement poses restric-
ions on exchange cycle length. 
In the case of altruistic donation, simultaneity may be less of a
trict requirement, as recipients can receive kidneys before their
peciﬁed donor donates, thus avoiding the risk of leaving a re-
ipient unmatched and without donor. Thus, the maximum length
EPs allow for chains may exceed the maximum length for cycles.
n fact, when the last donor repeatedly initiates a new chain in the
ext match run, the chain can become never ending. We refer to
ig. 1 for an overview of chain and cycle length limitations imple-
ented by European KEPs. 
KEPs admitting longer cycles for which they perform all trans-
lants simultaneously may need or prefer to spread these trans-
lants across multiple centres because of capacity limitations, as is
he case for the Dutch programme. 
Anonymity may form another reason to involve multiple cen-
res. Several European countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Spain, UK)
equire anonymity, either legally or by protocol. Anonymity is dif-
cult to ensure when performing surgeries for multiple pairs in-
olved in an exchange in the same hospital or when the donor
ravels to the hospital of the patient for the transplant. 
Large travel distances for donors or kidneys can be consid-
red undesirable. Spain for example, prefers to match recipients to
onors from the same region. 
.4. HLA-testing and re-optimisation 
Before a transplant is conducted, laboratory tests for HLA
atching and cross matching must be done. Depending on the
ab results, the transplant can be considered infeasible, or requir-
ng immunosuppression and/or desensitisation. The European KEPs
ary considerably in their organisations of the lab testing and the
ntegration of the lab tests with the match runs. 
HLA matching requires the HLA proﬁle of each recipient and
ach donor to be determined. HLA matches can subsequently
e determined by comparing the HLA proﬁles of donors and
ecipients. HLA cross matching requires to determine whether a
ecipient has antibodies against the speciﬁc HLA of a donor. The
ompatibility check of a pair is done ﬁrst via so-called virtual
rossmatch tests by comparing the ABO types and the HLA data of
he patient and donor. For pairs that are matched and estimated
o be compatible, a laboratory crossmatch test must subsequentlyPlease cite this article as: P. Biró, J. van de Klundert and D. Manlove 
Programmes, European Journal of Operational Research, https://doi.org/e done before transplantation is approved. The timing of the lab
rossmatch tests differ across countries, as these can be costly or
ime consuming, especially if multiple HLA labs are involved in
he testing. 
For KEPs with smaller numbers of participating pairs and in
maller countries it may be feasible to conduct all the lab cross-
atch tests prior to executing the match run. Poland and Portu-
al have adopted this practice. For larger KEPs, complete a-priori
rossmatching is often considered undesirable. The lab crossmatch
esting is then done after the match run on the virtual crossmatch
nput has resulted in a set of cycles (and chains) to consider for
ransplantation. Now, any cycle or chain can only be executed if all
ransplants implied by the cycle (or chain) are between a recipient
nd donor for which the lab crossmatch is negative. 
European KEPs have different procedures to advance in case
here are positive crossmatches for one or more transplants in the
roposed exchanges. Three examples for crossmatch testing and re-
ptimisation strategies in large KEPs are: 
• UK: The UK KEP uses multiple HLA-labs and considers only
one solution per periodic match run. To improve the likeli-
hood that all transplants in a cycle will proceed the UK KEP
only allows pairwise and three way exchanges to minimise
the risk of immunological, clinical or logistical reasons pre-
venting transplants proceeding to plan. Moreover, it prefers
three-way exchanges that contain embedded pairwise ex-
changes, such that an embedded pairwise exchange can go
ahead if the three-way exchange cannot proceed ( Manlove
& O’Malley, article 2.6, 21pp, 2014 ). After the crossmatch re-
sults have been obtained, the KEP performs as many trans-
plants as possible from the match run solution. 
• Spain: There are multiple HLA labs and two rounds of test-
ing. In the ﬁrst round an optimal solution is tested and in
the second round an alternative solution, where the can-
celled cycles are intended to be repaired. 
• Netherlands: One central HLA lab is responsible for the HLA
testing and the crossmatch tests. If a positive crossmatch is
found the match run will be repeated by the coordinators
to ﬁnd a next-best solution, until the crossmatch tests are
negative. 
.5. KEPs as dynamic systems and their long term performance 
After each match run, some recipients may have received a
ransplant, and hence these pairs and some or all of the altruistic
onors leave the KEP. Over time, new recipient-donor pairs arrive
nd register. Additionally, pairs may leave, for example as a result
f receiving a transplant from the DKD programme, ﬁnding a (half-
compatible donor, preferring a donation involving desensitisation
i.e. the presence of high titres of HLA antibodies in their blood) or
ecoming too sick to be transplanted. 
From the above it is evident that the effectiveness of a KEP is
ot determined by the quality of the solution found for a single
atch run, but by its contribution to address the long-term health
roblems of the recipients registering over a period of time, and in
elation to alternative solutions, such as the DKD programme and
esensitisation programmes. When assessing the ways KEPs are or-
anised and exchanges are identiﬁed at match runs, it is there-
ore appropriate to take a longer term perspective. This holds par-
icularly true when including altruistic chains that span multiple
atch runs. 
Longer-term performance criteria considered by European KEPs
re: total number of transplants performed, percentage of recipi-
nts in the KEP who have received a transplant, average waiting
ime until being matched, quality of life for recipients and donors
fter transplant, graft survival times, recipient survival rates, andet al., Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange 
10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.006 
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(  donor survival rates ( Andersson et al., 2019 ). Moreover, these out-
comes are considered over various recipient sub-populations, e.g.,
per blood type, or with regard to highly sensitised patients, to also
assess equity and fairness considerations. 
2.6. International collaborations 
As described above, international collaboration is common prac-
tice for DKD programmes and increasingly practised by KEPs. Such
collaboration can result in ﬁnding better matches and in match-
ing more recipients. The resulting international KEPs typically align
with national KEPs already in place, rather than replacing them.
We categorise the possible cooperations as follows: 
• Merged pools In the most advanced mode of cooperation,
the pools are merged and a solution is found for a match
run involving the merged set of pairs. In this variant, there
are no national match runs. Still, the countries involved
may have different constraints and objectives. An example of
this approach is STEP organised by Scandiatransplant, which
started in Sweden and now includes Denmark and Norway.
The same approach is used in the cooperation between Aus-
tria and Czech Republic since 2016 ( Böhmig et al., 2017 ). 
• Consecutive runs In the cooperation of Portugal, Spain and
Italy each country ﬁrst conducts its national matching run,
after which the remaining patient-donor pairs participate in
an international match run. 
• Outside registrations A (large) country may extend registra-
tion of pairs to its KEPs to pairs from another country. Such
arrangements exist between the UK and Ireland, and be-
tween France and Switzerland (where the pairs from the lat-
ter countries join the KEPs of the former). 
3. Matching models 
This section presents the models and methods used to ﬁnd a
solution for a single match run of a KEP. The objectives and con-
straints in the models, as well as the design of the solution meth-
ods are closely based on the contextual considerations described in
the previous section. 
Before going into the details of the models and optimisation
methods however, let us mention that most European KEPs have
adopted procedures through which in the end clinicians decide on
the actual matching. This is done with the purpose of taking all
relevant medical considerations into account, as well as to have
feasibility explicitly checked by all centres involved. As a result,
the technologies applied may not be optimisation methods in the
classical sense. For instance, the methods practised by the Czech,
Polish and Portuguese KEPs deliver a ranked list of solutions, from
which clinicians choose. In Spain, once a solution is obtained and
the centres are informed, those centres share clinical information
and coordinate the crossmatch tests. They inform the Spanish KEP
whether they advance with the transplantations resulting from the
match run. In the Netherlands the donor is assessed in the re-
cipient centre which ultimately decides on the suitability of the
donor for the patient (sometimes crossmatches tests are therefore
repeated in the recipient centre). 
There are two broad classes of models used to describe the
problem of ﬁnding an optimal set of exchanges for a match run.
The ﬁrst class encompasses graph models, which are intuitive and
insightful. A second class is formed from integer programming for-
mulations. These formulations have been particularly helpful to ad-
vance solution methods. Both classes, and the corresponding mod-
els and methods are considered in more detail below. 
The classical model that is used to formulate the problem of
ﬁnding solutions for a match run that take compatibility into ac-
count is the so-called compatibility graph . It is a directed graph D ( N ,Please cite this article as: P. Biró, J. van de Klundert and D. Manlove 
Programmes, European Journal of Operational Research, https://doi.org/ ), in which there is a node n i ∈ N for each recipient-donor pair for
 = 1 , . . . , n . There is an arc ( i , j ) from node n i ∈ N to node n j ∈ N if
he donor of pair n i is compatible with the patient of pair n j . If
BOi transplants are also considered, we may distinguish a special
et of arcs A ′ ⊆A representing half-compatible donor-patient pairs.
 self loop , i.e. an arc ( i , i ) where n i ∈ N , emanates from each (half-)
ompatible recipient donor pair. The compatibility graph is called
irtual compatibility graph if the compatibilities and weights are es-
imated based on virtual crossmatch test results. 
Multiple donors may also be registered for one patient, in
hich case we have an arc ( i , j ) if some of the donors of pair n i
s compatible with the patient of n j . 
We may distinguish a special class of nodes N a ⊆N to represent
ltruistic donors. A possible way of simplifying the modelling is
o assume that altruistic donors have speciﬁed dummy recipients
ho are compatible with all donors, except for altruistic donors.
ence the altruistic donor nodes n i ∈ N a have incoming arcs from
very node n i ∈ N N a . Any chain emanating from an altruistic donor
ode can now be trivially extended to form a cycle by adding an
rc from the last node on the chain to the altruistic donor node. 
After the modiﬁcation of D ( N , A ) for altruistic donor nodes, a
atch run solution consists of a set of cycles in D ( N , A ). As each
onor and recipient can participate in at most one transplant, the
roblem of ﬁnding a match run solution can now be interpreted as
 node-disjoint cycle packing problem. Moreover, a maximum car-
inality cycle packing in D ( N , A ) now refers to a match run solution
ith the highest possible number of transplants. 
Each arc ( i , j ), can have a weight w i, j to represent the util-
ty of matching the donor from pair n i ∈ N with the recipient of
air n j ∈ N . This value can include clinical considerations as well
s other priority-based contributions, such as matching type O
onors to type O patients. Moreover, nodes n i ∈ N can have weights
o distinguish priorities among recipients, for instance depending
n waiting time or sensitisation. Further, cycles can have cycle
eights, for instance according to cycle length or to the structure
f the subgraph induced by the nodes included in the cycle. An
xample of such a subgraph property is the number of pairwise
xchanges in the induced subgraph of a three-way exchange (also
eferred to as the number of back-arcs in a three-way exchange).
ll such weights enable solutions to be distinguished based on per-
ormance criteria for the KEPs and subsequently per match run. 
As is common, the graph model presented above can be formu-
ated as an integer program. Here we present two basic formula-
ions, referred to as the arc formulation and the cycle formulation
 Abraham, Blum, & Sandholm, 2007 ). 
The arc formulation has a binary variable y i , j for each arc ( i , j ).
inding a maximum (value) solution with cycles and chains of
ength at most K can be solved through (1) − (4) , where (4) en-
ures The arc formulation has a binary variable y i , j for each arc
 i , j ). Finding a maximum (value) solution with cycles and chains
f length at most K can be solved through (1) − (4) , where (4)
nsures that no cycle longer than K exists in the solution. 
ax 
∑ 
i, j 
w i, j y i, j (1)
.t. 
∑ 
j 
y i, j −
∑ 
j 
y j,i = 0 , ∀ i ∈ V (2)
 
j 
y i, j ≤ 1 , ∀ i ∈ V (3)
y i 1 ,i 2 + y i 2 ,i 3 + · · · + y i K−1 ,i K ≤ K − 1 , for each directed 
chain of length K (4)
The cycle formulation uses a binary variable x c for each cycle
and chain, see above) c of length at most K . We denote this setet al., Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange 
10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.006 
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 f cycles by C K . The weight of a cycle c is denoted by w c , which
an be taken as the sum of the edge-weights in the cycle, or can
e deﬁned differently as mentioned above. Finding all cycles in the
raph can be done using e.g. Johnson’s algorithm. 
ax 
∑ 
c∈C K 
w c x c (5) 
.t. 
∑ 
c∈C K ,i ∈ c 
x c ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ V (6)
As not all of the listed objectives can be expressed using
he edge-formulation, the cycle-formulation appears more robust.
or instance, objectives 2.-5. that prioritise shorter cycles or cy-
les with more back-arcs require a cycle formulation. However,
he edge-formulation can have additional value, for instance to
nd long (never-ending) chains, sometimes in combination with
ycle-variables. We refer to Anderson, Ashlagi, Gamarnik, and
oth (2015) and Dickerson, Manlove, Plaut, Sandholm, and Trimble
2016) for recent related results. Reﬁnements for the case where a
EP applies different upper bounds for chains and cycles are pre-
ented ( Anderson et al., 2015; Dickerson et al., 2016; Glorie, van de
lundert, & Wagelmans, 2014b ). 
.1. Data and parameters 
Most data required to solve actual match runs can be collected
rom medical records of recipients and donors. These records need
o include the ABO types and HLA proﬁles as obtained from the
ab test. The individual lab tests will also provide the data needed
or virtual crossmatch tests. These lab tests can be done accord-
ng to different methods and with different degrees of accuracy
nd hence the correctness of the virtual crossmatch tests may vary
mong KEPs. They may even vary within KEPs in case multiple labs
re involved, as is particularly relevant for international KEPs. 
The policy related parameters may be set implicitly, as is for
nstance the case when restricting the matching to pairwise ex-
hanges or to pairwise and three-way exchanges (Scandinavia,
pain, and the UK). Other KEPs may ﬁx these parameters explic-
tly in policies or leave them to be set manually (as in Poland
nd Portugal). Obviously, other constraint parameters and objective
unctions coeﬃcients must also be set. With few exceptions, these
arameters are ﬁxed as they are set in legislatory frameworks or
ormalised policies. 
.2. Objectives 
Below, we synthesise model variations among European KEPs.
bjective functions are presented ﬁrst, after which constraints fol-
ow. The performance measures, or criteria, considered in the ob-
ective function can often also be modelled in constraints and vice
ersa. For example, age differences may be weighed as an objec-
ive function component or bounded via a constraint. The synthesis
roups the criteria thematically. Where helpful, brief motivations
nd interpretations provide further clariﬁcation. Between brackets
e list the countries that include the objective criterion or con-
traint. We also include a short explanation of a sample implemen-
ation of each criterion for a cycle formulation. 
All European KEPs have formulated multiple-criteria objective
unctions. In fact, many adopt a hierarchical objective function.
or instance, the Czech KEP prioritises to maximise the number
f transplants, and within all such matchings, chooses one that
aximises the number of cycles, constituting a hierarchy of two
riteria. As hierarchical objective functions can be reformulated as
eighted objective functions, we may consider all objective func-
ions as weighted. However, as the hierarchies are often distin-
uished in the solution methods, the hierarchical models are also
xplicitly presented as such. Fig. 1 summarises the ﬁndings. Please cite this article as: P. Biró, J. van de Klundert and D. Manlove 
Programmes, European Journal of Operational Research, https://doi.org/Optimising number of actual transplants to perform: 
1. Maximising the number of transplants (All). 
This can be implemented with the objective function
max 
∑ 
w c x c where w c is the length of cycle c . 
2. Minimising the length of the longest selected cycle, as
longer cycles are more likely to result in positive cross-
matches, and thus in transplants that will not be performed.
Selecting shorter cycles is also important for logistical rea-
sons (NL, UK). 
Mathematically, this is formulated as min max w c x c where
w c is the length of cycle c . This can be implemented in an
ILP by adding a variable m i for each i ∈ { 1 , . . . , L } where L is
the length of the longest cycle. Constraints will ensure that
m i will take the value 1 if and only if a cycle of length ≥ i
is selected. These constraints are implemented by ﬁrst let-
ting C i be the set of cycles with lengths at most i (so C 3 is
the set of all cycles of length 2 or 3), and then adding the
constraints 
m i ≥
∑ 
c∈ C i x c 
| C i | 
for each i ∈ { 1 , . . . , L } . We can then minimise the function
m i to minimise the length of the longest cycle. 
3. Maximising the number of cycles selected, (which in turn
reduces the average lengths of the cycles) (CZ, ES, UK). 
This can be implemented with the objective function
max x c . 
4. Maximising the number of pairwise exchanges in the sub-
graphs induced by three-way exchanges, i.e. the number of
back-arcs, in order to improve the number of matches re-
maining after deleting positive crossmatches from the solu-
tion, and also for logistical reasons. (ES, UK). 
This can be implemented by the objective function
max 
∑ 
w c x c where w c is the number of back-arcs in cycle
c . 
5. Maximising the number of pairwise exchanges and three-
way exchanges with embedded two-way exchanges (UK). 
This can be implemented with the objective function
max 
∑ 
w c x c where w c = 1 if and only if cycle c is a pairwise
exchange or a three-way exchange with an embedded two-
way exchange. 
Improving the overall quality of the transplants: 
6. Minimising the number of implied desensitisations in KEPs
that allow ABOi and/or HLAi transplants (CZ, SE). 
This can be implemented with the objective function
min 
∑ 
w c x c where w c is the number of implied desensitisa-
tions in cycle c . 
7. Maximising the (weighted) sum of the HLA-matching scores
(CZ, PL, UK) with focusing on DR-antigen in particular (CZ). 
This can be implemented with the objective function
max 
∑ 
w c x c where w c is the weighted sum of HLA-matching
scores across all transplants in cycle c . 
8. Minimising age differences between the donors and patients
(BE, PL, ES). 
This can be implemented with the objective function
min 
∑ 
w c x c where w c is the sum of the age differences be-
tween donors and patients in transplants in cycle c . 
9. Prioritising paediatric patients (ES). 
This can be implemented with the objective function
max 
∑ 
w c x c where w c is the number of paediatric patients
involved in the cycle. 
10. Prioritising patients that have not started dialysis yet (BE,
PL). 
This can be implemented with the objective function
max 
∑ 
w c x c where w c = 1 if and only if the patient has not
started dialysis. et al., Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange 
10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.006 
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s  For the criteria below, prioritisation can be implemented by
including an objective that maximises the total weight of the
matching ( max 
∑ 
w c x c ) and adding a suitable weight to a cy-
cle for each transplant of the particular type. For instance,
the Spanish system prioritises highly sensitised patients by
adding 30 points to the weight of a cycle for each donor
with less than a 26% chance of ﬁnding a compatible donor.
Certain types of transplants (i.e., ones that require desen-
sitisation) can be avoided by instead subtracting from the
weight of a cycle. 
For improving equal access in expectation: 
11. Prioritise highly sensitised recipients (PL, ES, UK) 
12. Prioritise blood-type-O recipients, for which the donor pool
is the smallest (PL) 
13. Prioritise recipients according to (low) matching probability
[see e.g. Keizer et al. 2005)] (BE, NL, PL, PT, ES, SE) 
14. Prioritise recipients based on waiting time (in KEP / on dial-
ysis) (ES, UK / NL, BE, PT, ES) 
15. Prioritise identical blood-group transplants (BE, NL, PT, ES) 
16. Prioritise pairs with type-AB donors (ES) 
Logistical considerations: Besides prioritising shorter cycles
and chains, the following objectives can be explained by lo-
gistical reasons: 
17. Prioritise recipient-donor pairs from the same region (ES) 
18. Prioritise solutions that involve more transplant centres (NL)
Fairness: 
19. Minimising age differences between donor and donor of the
matched recipient (NL, PL, PT, UK) 
3.3. Constraints 
The list of potential constraints are as follows (see Fig. 1 ). 
To avoid cancellation or for logistics reasons: 
20. Upper bound on the length of cycles (PL, PT, SE, ES, UK) 
21. Upper bound on the length of chains (NL, UK) 
Upper bounds on the lengths of cycles (chains) are imple-
mented by not creating variables for cycles (chains) that are too
long. 
Fairness considerations: 
22. Providing strictly better donors for compatible pairs, where
the deﬁnitions of ‘better’ vary per country and relate to one
or more of the criteria mentioned above (CZ, NL, ES, SE, UK)
23. Providing strictly better donors for half-compatible pairs (CZ,
SE) 
24. Bound the donor-donor or donor-patient age differences (PL,
PT, UK) 
25. End the altruistic chain in the region where the donor reg-
istered (IT, NL, ES) 
The above restrictions can be implemented by not considering
cycles that break them. For instance, in the Italian system altruistic
chains that would end in a different region to the one in which
the altruistic donor registered would not be considered at all (no
variable x c would be created for such a chain). 
3.4. Solution methods 
The solution methods for the models formulated for each of the
European KEPs are grouped and synthesised below. 
• Edmonds’ algorithm. It is well known that the version in
which the maximum cycle length is bounded by two, i.e.,
only pairwise exchanges are allowed, reduces to ﬁnding a
maximum (weight) matching in an undirected graph. This
problem is solvable in polynomial time, e.g. through Ed-
monds’ algorithm. The Scandinavian KEP relies on the ap-
plication of Edmonds’ algorithm, even though their modelPlease cite this article as: P. Biró, J. van de Klundert and D. Manlove 
Programmes, European Journal of Operational Research, https://doi.org/is complicated by the introduction of half-compatibility
( Andersson & Kratz, 2016 ). The UK KEP uses Edmonds’ al-
gorithm as a ﬁrst step, to maximise the number of pairwise
exchanges within the selected exchange. 
• Graph heuristics. When allowing cycles (and chains) of
bounded lengths greater than two, the resulting optimisa-
tion problems are known to be NP-hard ( Abraham et al.,
2007 ). The Spanish KEP employs a polynomial-time, yet
heuristic solution method that searches for cycles of length
two and three. The heuristic makes use of Edmonds’ algo-
rithm. For further details we refer to Boﬁll et al. (2017) . 
• Exact methods using the arc formulation. The Polish KEP uses
the arc based integer programming formulation in the case
that enumeration of all cycles results in too many cycles.
The proposed approach for the arc formulation IP with cycle
length constraint is as follows. The cycle length constraint
is relaxed and the remaining IP is solved using standard
software. If the solution satisﬁes the cycle length constraint
it is optimal and is reported. Otherwise, constraints are
added to eliminate the cycles included in the solution that
are too long from the solution space, and the resulting IP is
again solved using standard techniques. This process repeats
until a feasible solution is obtained. Moreover, it is executed
hierarchically to ﬁrst obtain a maximum cardinality solution,
and subsequently optimise a weighted objective function.
The subsequent optimisation incorporates as a constraint
that the matching found is of the previously determined
maximum cardinality. 
• Exact methods using the cycle formulation. The Portuguese
KEP uses exact methods to solve the cycle-based integer pro-
gramming formulation. The Polish KEP does likewise if the
number of cycles is not too large. This is done hierarchically
to ﬁrst obtain a maximum cardinality solution, and subse-
quently optimise a weighted objective function. The UK KEP
uses multiple hierarchical levels that are optimised sequen-
tially ( Manlove & O’Malley, article 2.6, 21pp, 2014 ). The ﬁrst
level is optimised using Edmonds’ algorithm, while later lev-
els use the cycle formulation to potentially select different
exchanges that still contain the same number of pairwise
exchanges as computed by Edmonds’ algorithm. An impor-
tant part of using the cycle formulation is generating all cy-
cles within a graph. This can be done using e.g., Johnson’s
algorithm. 
• Enumerative methods. The Dutch and Czech KEPs in princi-
ple enumerate all solutions. To reduce the search space, the
Czech KEP ﬁrstly determines all strongly connected compo-
nents of the compatibility graph (in polynomial time) and
subsequently enumerates per component. Both KEPs subse-
quently present a sorted list of solutions. From this list, the
computer program of the Dutch KEP only shows one opti-
mal solution. The proposed exchanges in this solutions are
tested and in the case of a positive crossmatch a new (next-
best) solution is sought (and tested). 
. Discussion and conclusion 
Kidney Exchange Programmes are complex and dynamic health-
are system components addressing the needs of patients with
SRD. Variation among healthcare systems - for instance regard-
ng the effectiveness of the deceased donation programme - subse-
uently translates into variation in purposes of KEPs. The detailed
ountry descriptions which we composed and synthesised show
hat this translates into variation in KEP designs. The size of the
ountry and the KEP pools, and the number of HLA labs involved
n cross match testing also affect the KEP designs. Finally, KEP de-
igns importantly vary with differences in ethical and legal frame-et al., Modelling and optimisation in European Kidney Exchange 
10.1016/j.ejor.2019.09.006 
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forks e.g. regarding the admission and integration of altruistic do-
ation. A ﬁrst conclusion is therefore that each of the European
EPs is designed to ﬁt its particular context and should be assessed
ithin this context. By consequence, an apparently advanced KEP
hat serves its own context well may be a poor match in another
etting. For instance, while some countries have advanced to in-
rease the effectiveness of altruistic donation, altruistic donation
s considered unethical and forbidden by law in other (neighbour-
ng) countries. Likewise, some countries prefer desensitisation as
 treatment for a patient-donor pair over participating in a KEP,
hile other countries consider participating in the KEP preferable. 
Still, KEPs can learn from each other and advance by adopting
and adapting) each other’s practices. Below we synthesise com-
only applicable advances as emerging from this study. Operations
esearch can contribute by providing such general advancements.
n view of the conclusion above, however, we would caution
gainst ‘one size ﬁts all’ ambitions, or against claims that certain
odels and methods are better than others. Even presented em-
irical evidence should always be considered in context. Hence,
perations Research can also contribute by tailoring models and
ethods to the demands, norms and values of speciﬁc contexts. 
Let us start with some general observations on the models and
ethods used in the European KEPs. Integer Programming mod-
ls appear to be the most generic models in use. The UK, Portugal
nd Poland are robustly and effectively solving their match runs
sing Integer Programming-based solution methods. Other coun-
ries make use of enumerative solution methods or use heuristic
pproaches. Regardless of these methods, we notice that relatively
ew countries tend to directly implement the solutions provided by
he optimisation methods. Many countries leave the decision mak-
ng to a committee based on a (ranked) list of alternative solutions’
o allow the committee to weigh in additional considerations. 
A key aim of all European KEPs is to facilitate as many trans-
lants as possible. Therefore, the primary goal of (most of) the
odels and methods proposed is to ﬁnd maximum cardinality
atchings. Yet, because of the risk of cancellations (e.g. due to pos-
tive crossmatches), the practical goal is to maximise the number
f transplants that can actually be conducted. Countries have tai-
ored a variety of approaches to reduce the gap between the car-
inality of the maximum matching and the number of transplants
hat can actually be conducted. 
A generic solution is to restrict the solution to only consist of
hort cycles, as cycles involving fewer pairs carry a lower risk of
ancellation. Hence, many programmes put upper bounds on the
ycle length (3 is a common bound) or prioritise shorter cycles.
he usage of a single HLA-lab can also decrease cancellation risk,
s it harmonises test procedures and enables quick re-optimisation.
ountries with a central HLA lab (e.g. the Netherlands) may there-
ore allow longer cycles and need not consider minimising cycle
ength a high priority. Larger countries with multiple HLA labs can
itigate the failure risks by selecting solutions with back-up op-
ions, e.g., three-cycles with embedded two-cycles (UK and Spain). 
Altruistic donation can also greatly beneﬁt the number of trans-
lants. A ﬁrst main advantage of chains over cycles is that simul-
aneity is not considered to be required and thus chains can be
onger than cycles. A second main advantage is that the last donor
n the altruistic chain can be kept as a bridge donor for later, thus
xtending the advantages into the future. 
HLA-matching and age difference between matched donors
nd patients are the two main factors inﬂuencing expected graft
urvival times. Hence, many countries maximise HLA-matchings
nd/or minimise age differences to improve the quality of the
ransplants. Some countries even include such quality considera-
ions through hard constraints on HLA-matching or age differences.
For KEPs which allow ABO-incompatible transplantation, quality
an also encompass the number of desensitisation transplants inPlease cite this article as: P. Biró, J. van de Klundert and D. Manlove 
Programmes, European Journal of Operational Research, https://doi.org/he optimisation objectives. Match quality is also a consideration to
nclude compatible pairs. The patients from such pairs may ﬁnd a
etter matched donor themselves and their participation may also
e beneﬁcial to other participating pairs. To encourage their par-
icipation, KEPs then may guarantee quality of matching for recip-
ents from such pairs (as is the case in the UK). 
In addition to maximising the number of transplants and their
uality, equity is of explicit importance. For instance, many KEPs
estrict type O donors to donate to type O patients to ensure an
quitable transplant probability for type O patients. Similarly, sev-
ral KEPS prioritise highly sensitised patients to improve their poor
atch probability. Following comparable fairness principles, some
EPs prioritise patients with long waiting times. 
Ethical considerations are not limited to participants in single
atch runs. From a policy perspective, the effectiveness of KEPs is
ypically evaluated over time and hence for larger populations. The
elationships between the complex optimisation models, methods
nd objectives employed for single match runs and the longer-term
utcomes considered by policy makers is as yet not always well
nderstood. This is certainly an area for further research where
nalysis on multiple, longitudinal, empirical data sets is called
or. 
Lastly, it is worth considering the emerging cross-national ini-
iatives. Three collaborations have already started: between Aus-
ria and the Czech Republic, between Italy, Portugal and Spain,
nd between Sweden, Norway and Denmark. For now these cross-
ational KEPs have mainly considered patients left unmatched in
he national KEPs. We may expect the cross-national KEPs to fur-
her expand their beneﬁts in the near future when initiating to
erge national patient pools and to optimise the resulting cross-
ational patient pool. This will bring about new challenges. Firstly,
ow to ensure that national regulations (constraints) and prior-
ties (optimisation criteria) of each participating country are re-
pected. Secondly, it should be noted that consideration of equity
nd fairness now not only apply to individual patients, but also
o patient populations from multiple countries. Patients from one
ountry might beneﬁt more than patients from another country.
uch equity considerations occurring among countries form a rela-
ively unexplored area. The current European cross-national initia-
ives can play a guiding role in developing equitable cross-national
EPs and in the lively global scientiﬁc and policy discourses
n this matter ( Bozek et al., 2018; Delmonico & Ascher, 2017;
uropean Union National Competent Authorities on Organ Dona-
ion & Transplantation, 2–18 ). 
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